

Macro Insights Weekly

Coming US economic noise and Fed

Group Research

February 3, 2025



Taimur Baig
Chief Economist
taimurbaig@dbs.com




Nathan Chow
Senior Economist
nathanchow@dbs.com

For Alliance Bank clients, please direct your enquiries to Malaysia Research +603 2604 3915 general@alliancedbs.com

- *Game of tariffs has begun. Which tariffs stay and which are bluffs will be the hallmark of things to come. Trade, immigration, and fiscal noise will constrain the Fed's policy easing space.*
- *Growth rates in Mexico and Canada are bound to get hit. China's exporters will feel the pain too.*
- *In the US, we see near-term downside to growth and upside to inflation.*
- *We forecast 2% growth in 2025-26 and inflation in the 2.5-3% range.*
- *The Fed will find it hard to cut rates substantially in this context.*
- *A terminal rate of 4% is in store, in our view.*

Chart of the Week: US economy marches on

The Biden administration has handed over a US economy on the march to the Trump team. GDP grew by a robust 2.8% in 2024, with consumption, investment, and public spending firing on all cylinders. Strong demand fuelled imports, pushing up the trade deficit and making net exports a negative contributor to growth. A mix of protectionism, deregulation, tax/spending cuts, and immigration restrictions would influence the economy in the coming years; we think around 2% growth await.



Commentary: Coming US economic noise

The game of tariffs, as expected, has intensified. The US government is set to impose substantial tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and China. Many more such measures are forthcoming, we're sure. We are also sure that there will be an element of brinkmanship, some tariff threats on certain products and countries will be issued and then withdrawn after extracting some concessions. We also expect retaliatory measures by trading partners, especially toward products with their origins in republican-run "red" states. Noise and lobbying over trade policy are about to spike.

In thinking through the ramification of tariffs, threatened or actual, we should begin with the premise that time for price cuts or passing on savings to customers from productivity gains is over for the time being. Businesses, facing a tight labour market and still-strong demand environment, would pass on tariff-induced costs readily. Given the types of goods heavily traded between US, Canada, and Mexico, we see immediate upside to autos and gasoline. Also, demand for US exports would be affected as retaliatory measures are implemented.


Mexico's export sector, currency, and price level could be destabilised severely; Canada will also likely face considerable damage. Chinese exports, particularly those that have done well lately through the direct-to-consumer delivery model, would likely suffer the most.

The myriad goals of Trump, which include scaling back multilateralism, downsizing the government, reducing the oversight of tech and financial sectors, scaling back immigration, pushing through tax cuts, encouraging fossil fuel production, among others, do not lend

themselves to macro stability in the near term. **This in turn could have the effect of paralysing the Fed from acting, as forecasts become harder in the cacophony of policy noise.**

Given the strong momentum in the US economy seen through end-2024, we ought to forecast 2.5%+ growth for 2025 and 2026, but would be pegging our forecast to around 2% instead, incorporating the heightened policy noise. Beyond tariffs, immigration tightening measures, along with consolidation of public sector payrolls and spending would be growth negative, offsetting supportive measures like deregulation and tax cuts, in our view.

Inflation has already been stalling long before settling at the Fed's target of 2%. With tariffs and tax cuts in play, we see headline and core inflation more in the 2.5-3% range the next two years. Unless there are major financial stability related concerns, the Fed would find it hard to carry out substantial accommodation; **we see 4% as the terminal rate in this cycle**, putting aside the scenario of Trump finding ways to force the Fed into cutting rates.




T *Taimur Baig*

FX: Knives out – Trump’s tariffs enhance the USD’s haven appeal


Our belief in US President Donald Trump’s tariffs driving the USD’s haven appeal paid off.

US President Donald Trump announced 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico and an additional 10% tariff on Chinese imports taking effect from February 4. During Trump 1.0, the US-China tit-for-tat tariff war that started in 2018 maintained the USD’s haven status until it became clear that the Phase One Trade deal was coming in January 2020. Due to the retaliatory nature of the trade war, the USD’s uptrend also ended up choppy after its initial surge in 2Q18.



US-led trade tensions today will likely be worse than Trump 1.0. Trump is imposing tariffs faster, at higher rates, and with a broader scope, targeting most goods from both rivals and allies alike. **The universal tariff policy under Trump 2.0 extends beyond its previous role as a leverage tool for negotiation in Trump 1.0.** First, Trump has adopted a more protectionist stance that aims to boost domestic production apart from reducing the trade deficit. Second, the tariffs are positioned as a revenue source to offset the

extension of tax cuts set to expire at the end of 2025. Third, Trump’s tariff threat against the Eurozone aligns with his objective of boosting US oil and gas exports.



Speculators held on to their net short currency positions, underscoring the USD’s fall in January as a correction in the uptrend established during the Trump Trades in 4Q24. Last week’s FOMC decision to keep rates unchanged affirmed the Fed’s concerns over inflation’s slow progress towards the 2% target due to Trump’s policy mix of tariffs, tax cuts, and mass deportation of illegal migrants. Hence, the **Fed’s congressional semi-annual testimonies on monetary policy on February 12 could be a significant event rolling back Fed cut expectations.** Conversely, many central banks continued to ease monetary policy to support their less resilient economies in anticipation of heightening global trade tensions. Markets have also increased their bets for 25 bps cuts in the UK on February 6, Australia on February 18, and a 50bps cut in New Zealand on February 19.

Philip Wee

Group Research

Economics & Strategy

Taimur BAIG, Ph.D.

Chief Economist

Global

taimurbaig@dbs.com

Wei Liang CHANG

FX & Credit Strategist

Global

weiliangchang@dbs.com

Tracy Li Jun LIM

Credit Analyst

USD Credit

tracylimt@dbs.com

Amanda SEAH

Credit Analyst

SGD Credit

amandaseah@dbs.com

Nathan CHOW

Senior Economist

China/HK SAR

nathanchow@dbs.com

Eugene LEOW

Senior Rates Strategist

G3 & Asia

eugeneleow@dbs.com

Daisy SHARMA

Analyst

Data Analytics

daisy@dbs.com

Han Teng CHUA, CFA

Economist

Asean

hantengchua@dbs.com

Teng Chong LIM

Credit Analyst

SGD Credit

tengchonglim@dbs.com

Joel SIEW, CFA

Credit Analyst

SGD Credit

joelsiew@dbs.com

Mo JI, Ph.D.

Chief Economist

China/HK SAR

mojim@dbs.com

Tieying MA, CFA

Senior Economist

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan

matieying@dbs.com

Mervyn TEO

Credit Strategist

USD Credit

mervynteo@dbs.com

Byron LAM

Economist

China/HK SAR

byronlamfc@dbs.com

Radhika RAO

Senior Economist

Eurozone, India, Indonesia

radhikarao@dbs.com

Samuel TSE

Economist/Strategist

China/HK SAR

samueltse@dbs.com

Violet LEE

Associate

Publications

violetleeyh@dbs.com

Philip WEE

Senior FX Strategist

Global

philipwee@dbs.com

Sources: Data for all charts and tables are from CEIC, Bloomberg and DBS Group Research (forecasts and transformations)

GENERAL DISCLOSURE/ DISCLAIMER (For Macroeconomics, Currencies, Interest Rates)

The information herein is published by DBS Bank Ltd and/or DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited and distributed by AllianceDBS Research Sdn Bhd (ADBS), a subsidiary of Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad (ABMB) (each and/or collectively, the "Company"). It is based on information obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but the Company does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to its accuracy, completeness, timeliness or correctness for any particular purpose. Opinions expressed are subject to change without notice. This research is prepared for general circulation. Any recommendation contained herein does not have regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and the particular needs of any specific addressee. The information herein is published for the information of addressees only and is not to be taken in substitution for the exercise of judgement by addressees, who should obtain separate legal or financial advice. The Company, or any of its related companies or any individuals connected with the group accepts no liability for any direct, special, indirect, consequential, incidental damages or any other loss or damages of any kind arising from any use of the information herein (including any error, omission or misstatement herein, negligent or otherwise) or further communication thereof, even if the Company or any other person has been advised of the possibility thereof. The information herein is not to be construed as an offer or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any securities, futures, options or other financial instruments or to provide any investment advice or services. The Company and its associates, their directors, officers and/or employees may have positions or other interests in, and may effect transactions in securities mentioned herein and may also perform or seek to perform broking, investment banking and other banking or financial services for these companies. The information herein is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity that is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country, or other jurisdiction (including but not limited to citizens or residents of the United States of America) where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation. The information is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security in any jurisdiction (including but not limited to the United States of America) where such an offer or solicitation would be contrary to law or regulation.

This report is distributed in Singapore by DBS Bank Ltd (Company Regn. No. 196800306E) which is Exempt Financial Advisers as defined in the Financial Advisers Act and regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. DBS Bank Ltd may distribute reports produced by its respective foreign entities, affiliates or other foreign research houses pursuant to an arrangement under Regulation 32C of the Financial Advisers Regulations. Singapore recipients should contact DBS Bank Ltd at 65-6878-8888 for matters arising from, or in connection with the report. This report is distributed in Malaysia by AllianceDBS Research Sdn Bhd.

DBS Bank Ltd., 12 Marina Boulevard, Marina Bay Financial Centre Tower 3, Singapore 018982. Tel: 65-6878-8888. Company Registration No. 196800306E.

DBS Bank Ltd., Hong Kong Branch, a company incorporated in Singapore with limited liability. 18th Floor, The Center, 99 Queen's Road Central, Central, Hong Kong SAR.

DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited, a company incorporated in Hong Kong with limited liability. 13th Floor One Island East, 18 Westlands Road, Quarry Bay, Hong Kong SAR

AllianceDBS Research Sdn Bhd (128540 U), 19th Floor, Menara Multi-Purpose, Capital Square, 8 Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Tel.: +603 2604 3915.

Virtual currencies are highly speculative digital "virtual commodities", and are not currencies. It is not a financial product approved by the Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission, and the safeguards of the existing investor protection regime does not apply. The prices of virtual currencies may fluctuate greatly, and the investment risk is high. Before engaging in such transactions, the investor should carefully assess the risks, and seek its own independent advice.